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Editorial
In the fall of 2015 and the spring of 2016 a group of students in 
different disciplines in the humanities at Bucknell University, working 
with the Bucknell University Press, decided to get together to create a 
journal to feature and publish serious academic and scholarly writing by 
students. Between 2008 and 2010, students in the Comparative Human-
ities Program at Bucknell had published a journal entitled The Comparative 
Humanities Review. We wanted our journal to benefit from the example set 
by our predecessors and to provide some continuity with what had been 
done before. 
However, we also wanted our journal to be separate and different 
from The Comparative Humanities Review and other venues for current stu-
dent writing at Bucknell. The Humanities Review thus addresses the in-
terests and needs of students working in any and all of the humanities 
disciplines and the humanistically oriented social sciences (such as reli-
gion, history, economics, psychology, and anthropology). 
Our remit, displayed on the inside front matter of this journal, will, 
we hope, be inclusive and encouraging. The Humanities Review aims to be 
a peer reviewed journal publishing one or two issues annually of student 
work of the highest caliber. All Bucknell students are welcome to submit 
work for consideration. Given the constant influx of new students, the 
board of editors will invariably see change from year to year; but as a 
board, the editors aim to seek, encourage and sustain serious academic 
work, regardless of point of view. In due course, we also seek to attract 
submissions from students at other American and Canadian universities 
and colleges, and, indeed, from students worldwide. While we expect 
most submissions to be in the English language, the editors are also will-
ing to consider and publish work of suitable quality in languages other 
than English. 
While the critical and scholarly goals of The Humanities Review will 
be uppermost, those editing the journal will also have opportunities of 
working closely with the staff of Bucknell University Press in learning 
about academic publishing. The editors thank the Bucknell Humanities 
Center for their incredible support and guidance in this important and 
exciting academic undertaking.
June: I miss Summer already. 
May: I know. 
June: Ever since I met her I’ve always wondered, “Why her? Why not 
someone else?”
May: You mean about why you miss her and not someone else?
June: Yes. 
May: Then perhaps you need to answer why you love her first. 
June: She’s just wonderful. 
May: You’re saying you love her because she is “wonderful”? Or be-
cause you think of her as being wonderful?
June: Both.
May: But wouldn’t everyone in the world love her if she were won-
derful in herself?
June: Yes. 
May: Do you think everybody in the world loves her? 
June: Obviously, no.
May: So wouldn’t it be better if you say that you think that she is 
wonderful?
June: Yeah, but when you put it that way it seems like my thinking 
about her might not be true—she might not really be wonderful only that 
I think she is. You know what I mean?
May: You mean that if it was the case that only you thought that she 
is wonderful and others didn’t, you might be delusional or something?
June: Yeah kinda.
May: But that’s fine though. I’m not suggesting that you should feel 
that way. You would be talking about how she appears to you and how 
you make her appear to yourself, but not about how she is in herself.1 We 
cannot know anything-in-itself. 
Arbitrary Love: A Dialogue
Shishir Budha
This is a dialogue between two old friends June and May who are in their early thir-
ties. June is a freelance writer and May is a graduate student. May went with June 
to see June’s romantic partner, Summer, in Strasbourg. Now the friends are 
on a plane flying back to New York. Endnotes in this dialogue are used 
for philosophical exposition.
June: I’m not disagreeing. I cannot claim to know things from within 
or things in themselves. I think I remember in college when we read Kant, 
right?
May: Oh yeah, he talked about the implausibility of thing in itself, 
the noumenal world, and that we can only experience it phenomenally as the 
thing appears to us.2
June: I remember! But (pause) how does this relate to why I love Sum-
mer and not someone else?
May: Yeah, okay. Do you think other people out there are wonderful 
too?
June: I guess. I don’t know. 
May: Would you say that not everybody has appeared to you as ‘won-
derful’ as she because if so, you would love everybody who is like her in 
terms of manners, pursuits, and hobbies?
June: But everybody is not like her.
May: And she’s not like everybody else. 
June: Yes.
May: But you don’t know everybody the way you know her.
June: Yes.
May: Why do you think that’s the case?
June: Because I haven’t met everybody.
May: But you met her.
June: Yes.
May: Where did you meet her again?
June: Glasgow.
May: Oh right. Could it have been had you met someone else, you 
would have loved them instead?
June: I guess but that’s the talk about a different reality and I don’t 
find that very consoling. 
May: Do you think the fact that you love her and not someone else 
is arbitrary?
June: No. 
May: Why?
June: I can’t just go start loving everybody according to my will.
May: Exactly.
June: What do you mean ‘exactly’? Doesn’t that undermine what you
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said?
May: What I meant by arbitrary was not that you can simply decide 
to love anybody, but precisely that you can’t.3
June: I’m having a hard time following you.
May: I’m sorry. Do you remember Ferdinand de Saussure?
June: I don’t think so.
May: He was a linguist. He was the one to say: “the linguistic sign is 
arbitrary.”4
June: What does that mean?
May: The sign is the whole of the signifier and the signified. The sig-
nifier is the sound-image like “cat” and the signified is the concept of a cat. 
June: Okay … So it’s like the name “cat” means a cat?
May: Not really. The sign is not the whole of the “name” and the 
“thing.”5 It is the whole of a “sound-image” and a “concept.” The sign 
doesn’t stand for what is outside ourselves.
June: So you’re saying it’s all in our heads?
May: Haha. Pretty much.
June: But that’s kinda “crazy talk” to me. Don’t you think it’s quite 
outlandish to say that?
May: You’re not wrong. But remember when we were talking about 
Kant on how we can’t say much about things-in-themselves?
June: Yeah … 
May: Saussure is saying something similar. The sign only links 
“thoughts” and “sounds,” not “names” and “things.”6
June: Okay, alright. So when I say “cat,” there is no cat out there but 
only my thought of a cat and the sound of my voice. 
May: Right. And there the most important thing is that the link be-
tween the thought and the sound is arbitrary. The thought of a cat and 
what one calls that thought is arbitrary.
June: I understand. But why did you bring this up? I mean what does 
linguistics have to do with love?
May: I can’t help but think that love can be informed in terms of 
Saussure’s understanding of language. Remember when you said that you 
can’t simply start loving everybody when I asked you if your love for her 
was arbitrary?
June: But according to Saussure the signifier is replaceable, right?
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May: Yes.
June: But she is not replaceable. 
May: Yes, and you can’t simply make yourself love anyone else be-
cause love is an affective state and it is not subject to voluntary willing. 
Do you agree?
June: Say more.
May: Would you say love is an affective state?7
June: Okay, yeah.
May: If there is a conflict in the affective state, would you still com-
fortably say that you love her?
June: No.
May: But if there is a harmony in your affective state, you would com-
fortably say that you love her?
June: Yes.
May: In that case, would you say that the agencies that are acting 
within your affective state are in harmony?
June: I guess so. 
May: Saussure thought that the linguistic agents need to be in agree-
ment or in harmony within the linguistic community to establish or re-
tain a “sign.”8 What the sign signifies is not subject to individual volition. 
You can’t simply decide to say “bat” and expect others to understand that 
you meant “cat.”
June: Hmm. So even though it is arbitrary, the sign is governed by 
harmonizing agencies.
May: Right. Saussure also said that the sign is “arbitrary in that it 
actually has no natural connection with the signified.”9
June: I love my mother because I have a natural connection to her.
May: But if you were raised and cared for by someone else, other than 
your biological mother since birth, you would still feel that you have a 
‘natural connection’ with that person, right?
June: I get it. Now, I can’t just decide that I want to feel about your 
mother the same way I feel about my mother. The arbitrariness of my 
situation is that it is contingent, that I grew up with my mother and not 
yours.
May: Yes, it is contingent. It’s the same way with language. We 
are always already in language. We are always already hurled upon this
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world. 
June: Yeah.
May: Yeah.
June: I agree with you and all, but all this talk about arbitrariness and 
contingency feels very disorienting and uncomfortable. I wonder if this 
way of thinking diminishes any value of love or any process of signifying.
May: Yeah, let’s talk about that. Do you think you could ever stop 
loving Summer?
June: I hope I don’t, but I can’t speak for the future. 
May: If it were out of ‘necessity,’ wouldn’t you always love her?
June: Of course. 
May: But one cannot be so sure, right? I think language and love are 
such that we can never them in our grasp. Never master them. Because 
to master would be to necessitate the process of signifying.10 What if we 
lived in a world where it was necessary to have one particular name and to 
love one particular person or a thing? 
June: I wouldn’t want to live in that world.
May: Me neither. So I don’t think the arbitrariness and contingency 
diminish anything. I think they free us. They let us play.11
June: That’s wonderful. How about I put it this way: in language and 
in love we are simply passengers in a vessel of contingency.12
May: Nicely put. Haha.
June: Haha. You know… I need some fresh air. 
May: (laughs) June, we’re on a plane. Wait until it lands.13
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Notes
1. Cf. Kant’s comments in Part II: “Transcendental Logic” in the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason, (Indianapolis, Ind: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 
1996), 508. Kant talks about how we can only report the truth “in-itself” 
as appearances but not know the “truth” as in itself. Our experience of the 
appearances makes us phenomenal beings. 
2. Ibid., 508-9.
3. As Ferdinand de Saussure notes, “the word arbitrary means not 
that individual speakers can just make language up, but precisely that 
they can’t; the sign is a convention that has to be learned and is not sub-
ject to individual will,” in “From Course in General Linguistics,” in The Norton 
Anthology of Theory and Criticism, ed. Vincent B. Leitch et al. (New York: W. 
W. Norton, 2001), 958.
4. Ibid., 964. Since June doesn’t already know who “Saussure” is 
supposed to signify, May could have told her that it signified a lady in 
Venice or a scholar from Mongolia. This shows how the link between the 
signifier and the signified is arbitrary and that the only reason one under-
stands of Saussure as a linguist is a purely contingent.
5. Ibid., 963. Saussure notes, “the linguistic sign unites, not a thing 
and a name, but a concept and a sound-image.”
6. Ibid., 967. Saussure thinks that “... the role of language with re-
spect to thought is not to create a material phonic means for expressing 
ideas but to serve as a link between thought and sound.” 
7. The affective state, which has concerned with the Subject’s “emo-
tions/feelings,” is to be distinguished from the cognitive state that involves 
process of thought concerned with knowledge.
8. Saussure, 965.
9. Saussure thinks that the signifying process of linking the signifier 
and the signified has no intrinsic necessity. Therefore, there is no natural 
connection between them. But one might not say the same about sym-
bols because they are more like metaphors and metaphors (as signifiers) 
seem to bear semblance with the signified. One can think of the balanc-
ing scales as the symbol for justice. But the “symbol” of peace as a dove 
with an olive branch is primarily a sign, not a symbol. How signs become 
symbols would be an interesting discussion but that is beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
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10. If one seeks to necessitate the processes that are suposed to 
be formed naturally, the language becomes dictatorial and demands 
conformity to it without the willingness of the rest of the Kultur. 
11. Kant talked about the “aesthetic experience” as a free play of 
the “imagination and understanding” which does not happen because 
of necessity but of contingency in Critique of Judgment (Indianapolis, Ind: 
Hackett Publishing, 1987), 62. In an aesthetic experience while looking 
at works of art the Subject’s imagination and understanding engage in 
a free play by attending to the form and temporality of object and find-
ing “purposiveness,” but not “purpose,” within that experience. We 
have aesthetic experiences not because of necessity that implies “pur-
pose” but because of contingency that implies “purposiveness” (64). 
The play in language and love is similar to that of aesthetic experiences.
12.  One can think of the vessel as metaphor of a confined space in 
which the “task of reading” remains always “protected” and never “opened,” 
as Jacques Derrida famously stated: “il n’y a pas de hors-texte” in Of Gram-
matology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 158. In the 
reading of a text we are confined by the signifiers and yet are able to find 
countless significations within it. One should not think of the text, or the 
language and love in context of my writing, as limited; it should be freeing.
13.  There is no ‘fresh air’ inside a plane. Trying to get a fresh air outside 
the plane will prove fatal. This is metaphorical of how language might 
limit our experience of the world. Mallarmé described language by us-
ing the metaphor of a rain streaked window to convey that language 
can only allude to our impressions of the world but cannot grasp the 
world itself in Mallarmé: The Poet and His  Circle. (Ithaca; London: Cor-
nell University Press, 1999), 227-34. He was critical of the dominant 
theories of the nineteenth century like realism and Romanticism.
Arbitrary Love 9
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An Interview with Professor Emily Wilson
Grayson Kennedy
Professor Emily Wilson, author of the first known English translation by a woman of 
Homer’s The Odyssey, visited Bucknell University on Friday, September 7, 2018 to present 
“Translating The Odyssey Again: Why and How.” I had the privilege to interview her for 
The Humanities Review after she presented a talk for undergraduate Classics majors in the 
Bucknell Humanities Center.
Kennedy: Why did you translate The Odyssey?
Wilson: I was asked to do it. I decided to do it after looking more 
closely at other translations, because I wanted to do something authentic 
with the original that was different than other translations. I realized that 
the majority of contemporary translations are in free verse, and I wanted 
instead to  use  a  pentameter because I thought the rhythm, the meter, 
of the original was so important. I wanted to do more to maintain the 
pace of the original, so I chose to translate it in the same length as the 
original in terms of lines. I found many other translations to be stilted or 
archaizing. There is a tendency in translations to make the original work 
more pompous that it really is, and more one voiced, only focusing on one 
character’s perspective.
Kennedy: How long did it take you to translate the whole text?
Wilson: Five years.
Kennedy: Did you ever get sick of it?
Wilson: I got stuck a few times 
Kennedy: I’m sure!
Wilson: Yeah, I didn’t get sick of it, but I certainly got stuck, particu-
larly in the beginning. There where many times were I’d get to a passage 
and I’d think, “Ok. This is very easy Greek, I know what it means—but 
I have no idea how to convey this in the same mood or style as the orig-
inal.”
Kennedy: What did you personally gain from translating The Odys-
sey?
Wilson: It was a lot of fun and very, very interesting because I didn’t 
do it primarily for me [pause] it’s really for people who haven’t read the 
original. I think that reading translated literature is a necessity for the 
world. I feel grateful to translate languages I don’t know because it broad-
ens my horizons. So I see it as a necessity in terms of global communica-
Kennedy
tions.
Kennedy: Are you aiming primarily toward writing for scholars, or 
really anyone who wants to read or learn about The Odyssey?
Wilson: I think really for anybody, especially because there’s already 
an existing market for at least American and British high school students 
who are being “forced” to read it, or for college classes. I hoped I would 
manage to create a translation that would feel enjoyable enough that stu-
dents, as well as anyone wanting to read The Odyssey for pleasure, could 
be engaged.
Kennedy: Is translation, in fact, the quintessential poetic mode?
Wilson: I’m not sure if I would say poetic. I would say that transla-
tion makes you focus on writing as a craft. In a translation you’re making 
up the words. The thing the text says is already there, and your job is to 
make up completely different words. So there’s a focus on the craft of 
writing, the craft of creating passages, sentences and lines and phrases in 
a very different way. 
Kennedy: Do you think it is necessary to translate works in the lan-
guage of every new century? For example, an eighteenth century transla-
tion of the Odyssey wouldn’t work for twenty first century students
Wilson: It depends on the reader. I personally don’t see the point of 
translating, let’s say Shakespeare, if you’re a native english speaker.
Kennedy: I remember, when I first read Shakespeare in sixth grade, 
the text came with lines translated in modern english phrases. Do you 
think that is necessary?
Wilson: No, I think that it’s counterproductive. I think the point of 
reading old prose is to have the ability to read fluently in the original 
language. I think not all old texts necessarily need a translator. I think 
that being a translator is a writerly craft, not just about understanding 
the language. 
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Kennedy: As a translator, did you ever feel invisible, or did you feel 
empowered by your work?
Wilson: There’s a lot of discussion in translation theory about wheth-
er or not it’s a translator’s duty to hide themselves. I agree that there’s a 
neglect towards translation … but I don’t think that totally foreignizing 
texts is the solution. People tend to assume that ancient history is un-
readable, and if this is reinforced by the translation, it doesn’t actually 
teach your anything about why, for example, everyone in antiquity liked 
Homer. I’ve had a range of different feelings about empowerment and 
not-empowerment. 
Kennedy: Professor Wilson, thank you so much for your time.
Wilson: Thanks for having me.
Notes
1. Homer, The Odyssey, trans. Emily Wilson (New York: W. W. Norton, 
2017).
2. Emily Wilson, interview with the author, September 7, 2018, Bucknell 
University, Lewisburg, PA.
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Blanchot’s “Reading” and my Reading of Disgrace
Kathryn Nicolai
It’s summertime and I spend fifty minutes every morning on the 
Metro North. I take the window seat, even though I know it is less prefer-
able to the common passenger and what my dad would call an “amateur 
commuter move.” But I sit there anyways because it allows me to see 
the quiet suburban world as the train rushes past towards an uproarious 
city. The blurred images detach me from the somber suits, earbuds, and 
coffee mugs surrounding me. I can pretend I am not yet touched by the 
daily haul to work, by the lack of meaning a cubicle embodies. Today I’ve 
brought J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace. A book I ordered for a class titled “Hu-
man Rights Literature” that was unexpectedly cancelled. On the cover 
blares a gold emblem that says the novel won the Nobel prize in litera-
ture. It is esteemed, so I take it off my bookshelf and acknowledge it has 
value in being read. I have no background on the book other than it likely 
ties in to the subject matter of Human Rights. As the train sputters for-
ward I start to read—a process and experience Maurice Blanchot analyzes 
in the essay “Reading” in his book The Space of Literature.
According to Blanchot, my years of schooling and my English major 
do not give me any edge over another reader. Blanchot introduces the act 
of reading stating, “reading requires no gifts at all and shows this appeal 
to a natural distinction for what it is. No one is gifted, be [s]he author or 
reader, and whoever feels that [s]he is feels primarily that [s]he is not—
feels infinitely ill equipped absent from the power attributed to [her].”1 
It is Disgrace that holds the power. My sole meaning is in my embodiment 
of the reader. I am a passenger of both the Metro North and the words 
on the page in front of me. It is my ability as a reader not to know, but to 
feel and experience the trees fly past me in the window I sit next to and 
the words singing on the page in front of me. It is the experience and the 
uncertainty that carries me.  
Perhaps I am already doing Blanchot a disservice, choosing Disgrace 
for its printed golden emblem, its Nobel prize. I am judging it by its cov-
er, which deems it “good” and “canonical.” But the cover and the merit 
of Disgrace cannot embody the experience of reading, as Blanchot states, 
“reading gives to the book the abrupt existence which the statue ‘seems’
to get from the chisel alone... Somehow the book needs the reader to 
become a statue.”2 Statues unfold to us visually—that in its spatial per-
ception we affirm its existence. But a book can only unfold or exist for us 
as we read, as we graze over the text. But for reading, the experience is 
different. Books unfold themselves to us as we read. Looking at a statue 
would be the same as just looking at the front cover of a book such as 
Disgrace and deeming it ‘good’ because of its gold emblem announcing 
its Nobel prize. Reading allows the text to continue to show itself to us 
beyond the cover. Not until I am dancing along Disgrace’s words can I be 
engulfed with the experience the novel offers. Critics, such as those who 
decide the winner of the Nobel prize in literature, determine the good or 
bad in the book, which attempts to objectify or master it and mark it with 
or without a badge of merit on the front cover. Disgrace would fall in to 
this canon of good work as a Nobel prize winner bringing people like me 
to read it for its reputation. This mark of merit on the front cover min-
imizes Disgrace to an esteemed award. Blanchot’s thinking opposes the 
use of critics. In Blanchot’s writing reading is not about mastery or total 
comprehension, but the experience of unfolding that occurs when you 
read. 
Although I am encountering the novel with knowledge of its schol-
arly praise, I have no working knowledge of its author J.M. Coetzee. To 
know the details about Coetzee’s life or his previous works would have 
tainted my experience with Disgrace further, according to Blanchot. The 
anonymity of the author is praised by Blanchot when he states, “every 
reading where consideration of the writer seems to play so great a role is 
an attack which annihilates [her] in order to give the work back to itself: 
back to its anonymous presence, to the violent, impersonal affirmation 
that it is.”3 Without knowing the circumstance of Coetzee I am free of 
assumptions. I allow my mind not to make judgements about the work 
or on how Coetzee would be attempting to portray certain storylines that 
connect to his life and history. I allow my heart to understand and feel 
solely the words and not the context in which they were written. I am not 
making specific conclusions based on what the text will mean because 
Coetzee wrote it, such as knowing that he is a South African writer who 
has experienced the apartheid and its impact. Instead, I’m pondering the 
meanings of the words, how it makes me feel and how it confuses me.
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Blanchot further discusses the relationship the author has with the 
reader when he states, “the writer can never read [her] work for the very 
same reason which gives [her] the illusion that [s]he does.  It has to 
escape from the one who makes it, complete itself by putting [her] at a 
distance, culminate in this ‘distancing’ which dispossesses [her] conclu-
sively, this distancing which then, precisely, takes the form of the reading 
(and in which the reading takes form).”4 When an author is in the middle 
of her writing process, they read their own work and try to embody the 
role of the reader, but they cannot truly imitate the reader because the 
writer is too personally connected to the work. They know the author as 
themselves in a way that does not allow them to read without a fogged 
lens of pride or personal interpretation. It is this “distancing” that Blan-
chot discusses which allows the work to exist by itself and comes to frui-
tion when read by the reader, not the author.
When I read I am not myself. I am not Kathryn Nicolai riding the 
Metro North working as an unpaid intern. I am not a twenty-year-old 
white female from a New York suburb. Instead I am empathetic. I am the 
characters the novel presents me. I walk in someone else’s shoes. I live a 
life that I know nothing about and start to have an idea about what this 
other life could mean as I flip the pages. Blanchot discusses the neces-
sity of depersonalization, stating, “what most threatens reading is this: 
the reader’s reality, [her] personality, [her] immodesty, [her] stubborn 
insistence upon remaining [herself] in the face of what [s]he reads—a 
[wo]man who knows in general how to read.”5 If I were me when I read, I 
would not be able to feel the paralysis of experiencing rape that Lucy feels 
in Disgrace, nor the disconnect that occurs between Lucy and her father 
David after, nor David’s love and yearning to connect with Lucy despite 
his inability to comprehend how she might feel. 
I could not even get a hint of the experience of these emotions if I 
were myself. It is only through the embodiment of these characters, not 
myself and my own thoughts about the world, that I am fully engulfed 
in the text and its world. It is through this depersonalization that I am 
altered, taking a piece of these characters with me when I get off the train 
and walk south towards Union Square. It is through Lucy and David that I 
understand the MeToo movement in a new way. I empathize with the sur-
vivor’s paralysis, the numerous reasons that keep survivors from pressing
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charges and speaking out, and a male’s inability to comprehend rape and 
its full effects. I hear David’s concern on Lucy’s apathy on staying slim 
and dressing nicely; I am not preaching feminist ideology on the male 
gaze and the limitation of women. I am listening. I am understanding 
and feeling as David. I undergo the same transition as David who slowly 
changes his values on animal rights and enjoys the companionship of an-
imals by the end. Never before had I thought about or understood animal 
rights in the ways discussed in novel. It is through the empathy of read-
ing that I am changed. I am no longer me when I read and I am different 
because I have read.
I did not read Disgrace for class nor did I write an essay on it trying 
to interpret its meaning. I did not master it or comprehend it. When I 
finished it I was confused. Nothing is resolved. The characters still have 
so much to cope with throughout the rest of their lives. There is a racial 
context to the novel I cannot seem to pin down. I sit in a puddle of con-
fusion and without the instruction or analysis of a professor, I sit alone 
pondering what it all means. I close the pages of Disgrace from the window 
seat of the Metro North that allows me to experience and feel the world 
flashing before my eyes in a new perspective. In the same way, I see and 
feel life in a new way when I read in the way Blanchot describes. I will 
return to Disgrace not to master it, but to experience it again, allowing it 
to unfold itself to me in a new way, allowing myself to become someone 
I do not yet know.
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Queer Poetry: Comparing the “Barbaric Yawp” to the “Howl”
Lauren Ziolkowski
Poets Walt Whitman and Allen Ginsberg, though having inhabit-
ed different literary and social eras, are intangibly connected through a 
number of commonalities in their writings, stylistically and culturally (in 
addition, according to Ginsberg, to their indirect genital contact). Stylis-
tically, both writers frequently use long lines—suspending subject, verb, 
or end-punctuation for sometimes page-long stanzas in order to allow 
the reader to meander through the work. Both writers also use catalogs 
as means of encouraging the reader to empathize with a diverse array 
of perspectives outside of her own. While these stylistic similarities are 
worth noting, it is their connection to the values of their respective time 
periods that stands as central to their relatedness as poet. Both poets in-
clude themes of sexuality within their works—typically detailing sexual 
encounters between lovers, as well as directly celebrating the naked hu-
man body. Among the more prominent similarities between the works of 
these two poets is the inclusion of homoerotic themes. This paper seeks 
to explore the representation of romantic attraction between two men in 
the works of Whitman and Ginsberg in order to demonstrate that Whit-
man writes of his alleged attraction to men in a much less overt—and 
much more emotional—manner than does Ginsberg. 
Before dissecting the texts of these writers, however, one should 
note that Whitman himself never openly identified as gay. Although intel-
lectual debate persists as to whether or not he truly was a member of the 
queer community, much of the biographical and literary research done 
has affirmed his alleged attraction to men. The poet likely did not grap-
ple with his queer sexuality until some point in the 1850s, according to 
American poet Galway Kinnell, primarily because he was “subject to the 
same inhibitions as the whole period was.”1 That is, Whitman was just 
as likely to suppress his queer identity as was the majority of LGTBQ+ 
society in the nineteenth century as a result of rampant homophobia. 
In fact, as noted in the footnote to Calamus in the 2002 Norton Critical 
Edition of Leaves of Grass and Other Writings, when his sexuality was eagerly 
questioned by English poet John Addington Symonds, Whitman aggres-
sively protested, asserting that he was not only heterosexual, but had
apparently fathered six children with various women.2 According to psy-
choanalyst Sigmund Freud’s phenomenon of over-resistance, Whitman’s 
stern refusal in response to being questioned about his sexuality ulti-
mately suggests his queer sexual identity. He overcompensates for this re-
pressed identity by not only denying it, but fervently attempting to prove 
his heterosexuality.3 
Many long-time readers of Whitman are able to recognize the surfac-
ing of this repression in Calamus—most notably in the poem “Here the 
Frailest Leaves of Me”, in which Whitman admits to the revealing, and si-
multaneously concealing, nature of his writings. In this poem, he claims, 
“Here I shade and hide my thoughts––I myself do not expose them, / 
And yet they expose me more than all my other poems.”4 Here, Whitman 
expresses that his authentic thoughts are unconsciously revealed in his 
poetry. He, himself, may not outwardly announce his gay identity, but 
this identity is woven throughout in his works. Between his defensive use 
of resistance, lack of evidence tracing any children back to his seed, and 
vulnerability suggested by “Here the Frailest Leaves of Me,” it is possible 
that Whitman made these extravagant claims about fathering six children 
in an anxious attempt to mask his true sexuality.
The queer tropes that appear in Whitman’s poetry within the con-
text of this personal background greater illustrate the poet’s emotional 
attraction to men. Of course, this is not to say that Whitman never did ex-
perience sexual attraction to men, as such a claim is likely untrue. Howev-
er, sexual relations between men in the nineteenth century were consid-
ered far more taboo than were emotional relationships. In fact, emotional 
companionships between two members of the same sex—often termed 
“homosocial” relationships—were considered both acceptable and nor-
mal during the period. The prominence of state sodomy laws in the Unit-
ed States at this time, however, served as a strong indication of America’s 
disapproval of same-sex sexual relationships – specifically between men. 
Thus, the sexual attraction Whitman experienced toward other men, as a 
result of societal condemnation, is made much more discrete in his poetry 
than is his emotional attraction. Take, for example, the following erotic 
scene chronicled in Section 5 of Song of Myself:
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 I mind once how we lay such a transparent summer morning,
 How you settled your head athwart my hips and gently turn’d over upon me,
 And parted the shirt from my bosom-bone, and plunged your tongue to my bare-  
 stript heart,
 And reach’d till you felt my beard, and reach’d till you held my feet.5 
With some of the aforementioned information in mind, we read this 
oral sex scene as though it were between Whitman and another male 
lover. However, whether or not Whitman truly is alluding to a scenario 
between himself and another male, he anticipates our assumptions and 
disguises this erotic scene potentially between two men as literally being 
between the body and soul. Thus, if Whitman were accused of alluding to 
gay oral sex in this section of Song of Myself, he could simply deny this ac-
cusation, claiming that the aforementioned erotic scene is between body 
and soul—not man and man. 
A similar disguise is seen again in Section 11 of Song of Myself in 
which Whitman describes a masturbation scene between a female voyeur 
and twenty-eight swimming men upon whom she gazes. He descriptively 
notes, “The beards of the young men glisten’d with wet, it ran from their 
long hair, / Little streams pass’d all over their bodies.”6 These two lines 
sexualize the bodies of the male swimmers, putting them in a position 
of spectacle. The female voyeur, however, is not sexualized to the same 
degree as the men upon whom she gazes. Because it is the men, rather 
than the female voyeur, whom Whitman describes as sexually desirable, 
he feels an obligation to disguise his own implicit sexual attraction to the 
bathers as that of the female voyeur—placing himself in her body. In this 
way, Whitman cannot be outwardly accused of exhibiting sexual desire 
for men, because he masks his own desire within the fabricated narrative 
of his poem. He, himself, is the body receiving fellatio from the soul in 
Section 5. He, himself, is the woman viewing the male swimmers here. 
He simply substitutes some other subject in the poem for himself in order 
to protect his queer identity from homophobic disdain.
Ginsberg, on the other hand, was much more overt about his sexual 
attraction to men, likely, in part, due to influence from the oncoming Sex-
ual Liberation Movement of the 1960s. Featured in the “Walt Whitman” 
episode of the Voices and Visions series, Ginsberg confidently asserts,
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“[Whitman] loved his fellows. He loved his young fellows…whether it 
was genital is another matter. Likely it was, as I know I’ve slept with Neal 
Cassady, who slept with Gavin Arthur, who slept with Edward Carpenter, 
who described sleeping with Whitman to Gavin Arthur.”7
Unlike Whitman, Ginsberg was not fearful of using his own, 
first-person voice when referencing sexually explicit, and often non-fic-
titious, scenes in his queer poetry. Consider some of the more straight-
forward lines in his poem “Sphincter” from Cosmopolitan Greetings: Poems 
1986-1992 which read, “I hope my good old asshole holds out / … active, 
eager, receptive to phallus / coke bottle, candle, carrot /banana & fin-
gers.” He then goes on to note his sphincter’s “rubbery muscular” texture 
and beckons any “orgasmic friend” to come enter him, “unashamed wide 
open for joy.”8 In his poem, Ginsberg makes clear that his specific sphinc-
ter is the one being addressed—that his sphincter welcomes the phallus 
and whatever else may come. With the removal of those sodomy laws that 
thwarted Whitman’s ability to be outward about his sexual relations with 
men, in addition to the socio-political influence of the Sexual Liberation 
Movement that contributed to the normalization of queer relationships 
and deconstruction of traditional gender roles, Ginsberg feels less of a 
necessity to hide his sexual desires from his audience. The societal con-
straints that inhibited Whitman were in the process of degradation by the 
mid-twentieth century.
Even in his better-known works, Ginsberg does not shy away from 
detailing his sexual experiences with other men. Consider his 1955 poem 
“Howl (For Carl Solomon),” which honors those members of society who 
are generally met with resentment, such as the impoverished, queer, or 
radical socio-political activists. Ginsberg, unapologetically using provoca-
tive language, celebrates those men “who let themselves be fucked in the 
ass by saintly motorcyclists, and screamed with joy,” and those “who blew 
and were blown by those human seraphim, the sailor, caresses of Atlantic 
and Caribbean love.”9 This line is especially significant in that it explicitly 
refers to gay oral sex between two men—directly contrasting Whitman’s 
masked allusion in Section 5 of Song of Myself and effectively indicating the 
continued degradation of stigma surrounding sexual encounters between 
men in the twentieth century.
While not as explicit about his sexual encounters as Ginsberg, Whit-
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man is rather direct about the emotional attraction he has experienced 
with members of the same sex. In fact, even Ginsberg himself recognized 
these differences between his own writing and that of Whitman’s. During 
a brief segment on Whitman’s sexuality in Voices and Visions, Ginsberg 
asserts, “[Whitman] never was overt in the sense of the ‘love that dare 
not speak its name.’ On the other hand, his descriptions of his feelings 
were overt.”10
Indeed, Whitman displays a much greater comfortability expressing 
emotional attraction to men in his poetry than he does expressing sexual 
attraction. Perhaps the most widely-cited lines that suggest this emotion-
al connection appear in “When I Heard at the Close of the Day.” Reveling 
in the memories of being united with his male lover, Whitman describes, 
“… the one I love most lay sleeping by me under the same cover in cool 
night, / In the stillness in the autumn moonbeams his face was inclined 
toward me, / And his arm lay lightly around my breast – and that night 
I was happy.”11 Notice that the two men are merely sleeping, the lover’s 
“arm [laying] lightly around [Whitman’s] breast.” This tender scene be-
tween two male lovers makes no reference to a sexual experience (such 
as fellatio or masturbation). However, Whitman paints the image of two 
men embracing one another, united under a mutual sense of emotional 
security. Most notably, unlike his use of homoeroticism in Song of Myself, 
Whitman recounts his emotional experiences with men in the first-per-
son point of view. He uses I-statements such as “… the one I love …” and 
“… that night I was happy.”12 By doing so, the poet not only confirms that 
he, himself, had these emotional experiences with another man, but that 
he feels comfortable letting others know about them.
This emotional attachment is suggested again in another Calamus 
poem titled “Of the Terrible Doubt of Appearances,” in which Whitman 
claims that the love shared between he and his male lovers secures his 
sense of reality. Of his doubts about reality, he notes, “To me these and 
the like of these are curiously answer’d by my lovers, my dear friends, / 
When he whom I love travels with me or sits a long while holding me by 
the hand.”13 Again, there is no reference to a particular sexual experience 
as there is in Song of Myself; rather, there is only the emotional—in this 
case, almost spiritual—bond that unites male lovers. It is not the sex or 
physical attachment that secures Whitman’s sense of reality, but it is the
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emotional reliance on a man that solidifies his doubt. Similar to his use 
of language in “When I Heard at the Close of Day,” the poet recounts 
his emotional desires in the first-person point of view in “Of the Terri-
ble Doubt of Appearances.” Just as it does in the latter poem, the use 
of first-person insinuates that Whitman feels no obligation to mask his 
emotional attraction to men as he does his sexual attraction.
Whitman spent much of his time in the mid-to-late 1850s exploring 
this emotional attraction to men in Pfaff’s Cellar—a restaurant and liter-
ary paradise for aspiring writers in bohemian Manhattan. An organized 
group of men seeking romantic companionship with other men—of which 
Whitman was included—known as the Fred Gray Association frequented 
Pfaff’s Cellar.14 It was among the Fred Gray Association that the poet met 
his alleged male lover Fred Vaughn, with whom he often shared letters. 
However strong their romance was, historical evidence suggests that it 
was Peter Doyle who ultimately stole Whitman’s heart (so much so that 
Doyle allegedly inspired the writing of Drum-Taps) in the late 1960s.15
Despite his membership in the organization (and the relationships 
that are rumored to have ensued), Whitman was confined to express-
ing romantic and sexual desire in secrecy—under the societally approved 
guise of homosocial friendship. Professor of English at Université de 
Montréal Robert Martin claims that, although being openly gay was de-
criminalized in a number of Western nations by the late-1800s, men were 
still being repeatedly attacked—even killed—for same-sex relationships 
in England and the United States well through the nineteenth century.16 
Because Ginsberg was not subject to the same intensity of homophobia 
in the mid-to-late twentieth century as was Whitman in the nineteenth 
century, he had much more freedom to express his sexualized identity in 
his poetry. 
Rebellion against WASP America’s orthodox views regarding sex-
uality strengthened in the mid-twentieth century as rock ‘n’ roll music, 
second wave feminism, and other major influences gained the attention 
of America’s youth and degraded those traditional value systems encour-
aged by its parents. By the 1960s, the Sexual Revolution in the United 
States was well underway, granting Ginsberg greater leeway to express 
his gayness openly without constant fear of personal harm. 
Whitman, however, lived in an America that was far from accepting
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of total sexual liberation. For this reason, he felt a societal pressure to 
disguise his sexual desire for men in his poetry. Rather than outward-
ly expressing his sexual experiences with other men, he alludes only to 
emotional experiences, as comradery between men was much more ac-
cepted as a social norm. Nonetheless, small scraps of his sexual desire for 
men are littered, perhaps without deliberation, throughout his poetry—
noticeable only to those willing to find them. As Ginsberg points out in “A 
Supermarket in California,” “I saw you, Walt Whitman, childless, lonely 
old grubber, poking among the meats in the refrigerator andeyeing the 
grocery boys.”17 We, too, see you, Whitman—receiving fellatio, watching 
those twenty-eight men wet and naked, gazing upon the grocery boys. 
You may not have been as outward about your queer identity as was Gins-
berg, but we recognize the signs you left us among your leaves. 
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From Prometheus to Zombies: 
The Cultural Phenomenon of the Living Dead
Katie Kooiman
Mary Shelley’s famous Gothic novel Frankenstein is also known by 
its longer title of Frankenstein; or The Modern Prometheus.1 As the extended 
title suggests, Shelley’s inspiration for the novel came from the story of 
Prometheus in Greek mythology. According to the myth, Prometheus is 
the god of fire and is known as a master craftsman because of his con-
nection to fire and to the creation of mortals.2 The legend of Prometheus 
developed throughout the Greek writings of Hesiod, Aeschylus, and Ovid. 
However, their interpretations of the Prometheus myth have been com-
bined and changed through history—in the writings of Shaftsbury in the 
eighteenth century, by Byron in his play Prometheus, and in the poem by 
Mary Shelley’s husband, Percy Bysshe Shelley, titled Prometheus Unbound.3
Although these other writers were influential in Shelley’s forma-
tion of The Modern Prometheus, they all differ from the Creature found in 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein in that they do not show the fragmenting and 
devastating effects that language can have in the life of a newly created 
being. The Creature within Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein is vulnerable not 
only because he is experiencing life for the first time alone, but also be-
cause he finds himself to be the “Other” within a society that quickly re-
jects him based on his appearances and language. Throughout the novel, 
Frankenstein does not use language to love and guide his Creation; rather, 
Frankenstein uses a limited amount of hurtful language to reject his Crea-
ture. Frankenstein’s absence in Creature’s life as his maker is reflected in 
Creature’s lack of knowledge in language or even symbols. The negative 
and fragmented influence of language within Creature’s life is what caus-
es him to never see the meaning of his life. 
Despite the differences in Shelley’s Frankenstein in comparison to the 
other forms of the Prometheus myth, it important for readers of Franken-
stein to know the elements of the original story to observe how the Greek 
myth has changed based on culture. Within the play Prometheus Bound 
by the Greek dramatist Aeschylus, one finds a representation of Pro-
metheus that would have been close to the way that the ancient Greeks
viewed this myth. As “one of the greatest tragic playwrights of his gen-
eration,” Aeschylus is known as the “Father of Greek Tragedy” as he was 
writing before both Sophocles and Euripides.4 Aeschylus, with his strong 
influence on Greek drama and tragedy, brought his own interpretation to 
his Prometheus Bound, as he rejected traditional Greek religion and showed 
Zeus as a tyrant. Conversely, in Hesiod’s poem about Prometheus, Zeus 
is written as a “god of justice.”5
There are many ways that characters within the Prometheus myth 
have been portrayed, however in Aeschylus’ influential tragedy, Pro-
metheus’ tragic flaw is his love of humanity. Prometheus steals fire from 
Zeus because of this love, but Zeus punishes him by commanding him 
to be chained and have his liver plucked by an eagle every night.6 Even 
though Prometheus’ fate is tragic, he is shown to suffer on behalf of his 
creation. Already in this beginning scene, Aeschylus’ Prometheus is dif-
ferent from Mary Shelley’s Prometheus because in Mary Shelley’s narra-
tive, Frankenstein does not love his creation. Instead of helping his Crea-
ture, Frankenstein is at once ashamed of what he has done; in fact, he is 
filled with “breathless horror and disgust.”7 Ironically, Frankenstein feels 
the most guilt about himself as he sees reflections of his own imperfec-
tion in his Creature. 
Additionally, the Greek tragedy portrays a different version of the 
gods in Prometheus Bound because in both Zeus and Prometheus the read-
er sees a higher being who is actively involved in the lives of humanity, 
though that engagement is often displayed through anger.  Nonetheless, 
Shelley displays a different view of Creator and God in that Frankenstein 
leaves his own Creation. Creature is left on his own as the “Other” in 
society without anyone to care for him because Frankenstein has rejected 
him. Shelley’s detached Creator demonstrates both a verbal and physical 
absence in his Creature’s life—an indication of her culture’s impact on 
the Prometheus myth. Shelley’s text is written in an era in which the idea 
of a God-guided Creation ceded to a widespread belief in the power of 
scientific progress.
Responding to Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, Percy Shelley wrote his 
four-act poem, Prometheus Unbound. Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound starts 
similarly to Prometheus Bound in that Prometheus is chained to the Cauca-
sus Mountain. However, as the title suggests, Percy Shelley’s poem differs
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from Aeschylus’ play in that it describes Prometheus’ journey to freedom 
rather than bondage. What is important in this study of Percy Shelley’s 
Prometheus Unbound is the way that he incorporates science into this Greek 
myth. As shown in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, the modern society reject-
ed the traditional beliefs of faith as truth. Instead, science and objectivity 
were idealized because they could be proven. The influence of science is 
shown in Prometheus Unbound in that Percy Shelley “associated electricity 
with love, light, and life.”8 Both Mary and Percy Shelley viewed electric-
ity as something that is life-bringing, a view that could be linked to the 
scientific discoveries during the time when they were writing. Yet, Mary 
Shelley does not explain how Frankenstein brings his Creature to life; in 
referencing the creation of life she writes, “I see by your eagerness and 
the wonder and hope which your eyes express, my friend, that you expect 
to be informed of the secret with which I am acquainted; that cannot be; 
listen patiently until the end of the story, and you will easily perceive why 
I am reserved upon that subject.”9 Although Mary Shelley’s narrator does 
not share how life is formed from death, readers suspect that Mary Shel-
ley’s inspiration came from the scientific discoveries of her time. 
According to Cartwright and Baker, a scientist named Giovanni Al-
dini “created a sensation when he showed that the limbs of all manner 
of dead animals jolted when electrified.”10 In addition, there was another 
account from one of Aldini’s experiments that describe the movements 
of a dead corpse: “the jaw began to quiver…and the left eye actually 
opened.”11 Throughout both of their writings based on Prometheus, Mary 
and Percy Shelley show life that is caused and created by science rather 
than a divine God. After Mary and Percy developed the idea of the living 
dead within their stories, many other aspects of culture such as film and 
television shows expanded on this idea of a deformed monster or “Other” 
living within society. 
In postmodern society, the idea of the living dead is represented 
most predominantly in popular culture through depiction of zombies. 
Even though representations of vampires have also had a great amount 
of influence in popular culture over the past fifty years, the images of the 
zombies are more meaningful because they represent “what it means to 
be a human in a postmodern world.”12 Because of the rejection of objec-
tivity of truth by the postmodern movement, people are invited to view all
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of life as a carnival; individuals can “play” the daily game of reinventing 
themselves. Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of the carnivalesque and grotesque 
realism is related to the postmodern cultural phenomenon of zombies 
because as “parodies of human beings, zombies reveal the most base and 
terrifying aspects of humanity, yet they also expose the human body as 
ridiculous and absurd.”13 People within postmodern culture identify with 
the way that the zombie presents the human body because, like the car-
nivalesque view of life as a carnival, the absurdity of the zombies justifies 
humanity’s continual reinvention of the self. 
As a reflection of the obsession with zombies and the living dead, 
many television shows about these monsters have developed and gained 
popularity. One of these television shows is called The Walking Dead. This 
American television series, created in 2010, follows the life of the lead 
character named Rick Grimes. Rick awakens from many months of being 
in a coma to find that he is in a post-apocalyptic world that has been over-
taken by zombies. Although Rick’s main battle in this television series is 
to protect himself and his family from the zombies, he also seeks shelter 
from the dangerous humans throughout the show as well. The popularity 
of The Walking Dead reveals society’s fascination with zombies. However, 
the creator of the show, Robert Kirkman, states that it is “about us” and 
“about how we respond to crisis.”14 Viewers of The Walking Dead may be 
attracted to the ways that people in a post-apocalyptic world might re-
spond to crises and learn how to rebuild society after the removal of all 
social structures
While all structure is taken away in post-apocalyptic worlds like that 
of The Walking Dead, the characters are left begging for the existence of a 
God who can bring order to the disorder of the world. In a similar way, 
Creature’s greatest desire is that his master, Frankenstein, would accept 
him and bring order into his meaningless life. Frankenstein’s search to 
understand the meaning of life is represented in his search for meaning 
within language. However, the language that Creature learns does not 
bring him acceptance. Rather, through language, Creature learns why he 
is rejected by humanity, an insight that leads him to reject the meaning 
of life. 
Borrowing inspiration from the Greek mythology of Prometheus, 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein began the cultural phenomenon of the living 
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dead. The idea of the living dead is found within zombies, but it is also 
found in any person or being that finds itself to be the outside or “Oth-
er” within a society. Although the myth of Prometheus influenced Mary 
Shelley’s story about Frankenstein’s creation, her monster of Creature 
is unique in that he is shaped by his language as well as Frankenstein’s 
lack of accepting language. Throughout Frankenstein, people do not accept 
Creature because they are frightened by his appearance—not because he 
acts in the way of a monster. Rather than being afraid of Creature, the 
characters within the story should be afraid of Frankenstein because Crea-
ture is only a reflection of his fallen creator. However, it is for this reason 
that Frankenstein cannot accept Creature; he sees the “Other” that he has 
rejected within himself. The way that humans learn to accept the “Other” 
within society is by facing their own brokenness first and discovering that 
all people—the living dead included—continue to reach towards a creator 
who will save them. 
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Aesthetic Transgressions in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein
Evan Dekens
 
In the current culture, Victor’s creature from Mary Shelley’s Fran-
kenstein is branded as a hulking green figure, stripped of all linguistic, 
intellectual, and physical capability, devoid of not only its original identity 
as a somewhat sympathetic, tragic intellectual figure, but of its individ-
uality and personal autonomy. The character “Frankenstein” is now an 
archetype instead of a character, a symbol of the impure, the ramshackle 
and the misplaced. Bridging the disparity and tracking the path that lead 
to this branding starts with the original 1818 text and ends in the current 
era. Tracking this evolution highlights the ways that the creature has been 
increasingly stripped of its intellect, its empathetic nature, and its indi-
viduality in an effort to symbolize Frankenstein’s monster as representative 
of the suppression of the intellectual, cultural, racial, or aesthetic “other” 
in society. 
As distinguished from its public persona, Frankenstein’s monster 
originated as a complex, intellectual, sympathetic character. Within the 
original text, the linguistic and the visual often interact in problematic 
ways for the creature, with his offensive appearance often irreconcilable 
with his undeniable humanistic characteristics and intellectual worth. As 
Denise Gigante describes it, “both the uncanny and the ugly fall under the 
rubric of the fearful; the crucial distinction between them is that while 
something may be uncanny for one person and yet not so for another, 
the ugly is universally offensive.”1 The two competing identities within 
the creature can be identified by their role in the interior and exterior 
aspects of the creature’s personal identity. The autodidactic nature of the 
creature’s intellectual enlightenment does not exclude the visual entirely, 
but only addresses it in the ways that the creature perceives himself as 
opposed to the way he is perceived by others. In these instances, the crea-
ture is not totally blind to the grotesque symbol that his body represents, 
despite his persistent belief that his auditory and intellectual value might 
in some way compensate for physical appearances. Though the creature 
displays vice and virtue, as well as complex inner moral conflict, even 
the recognition of multiple, often competing aspects of identity within a 
singular individual, discounts validity of the “othering” later experienced
by the creature. After his somewhat civil and fruitful encounter with the 
blind man living in the hovel next to him, the visual silence the creature 
had before enjoyed with the inhabitants of the house is broken, and the 
creature is immediately demonized categorically. 
Whereas relationships in the novel which are expressed primarily 
through the use of dialogue display the creature as an incredibly artic-
ulate, sympathetic, and unfairly persecuted figure, his appearance often 
discounts or undermines all internal characteristics. To the periphery 
characters, as well as Victor, the horror of the visual is thematized by its 
constant connection to the violent and horrific aspects of the narrative, il-
lustrating not only the way that visual horror produces a more deceptively 
potent emotional response, but also acts as one of the primary motivators 
of moral and psychological prejudice. The use of dramatic irony in the 
case of the murder of William is especially significant in this respect, as 
the sharp incongruity between the substance of the events which occur, 
and the version of the events which the characters perceive and act upon 
in the novel highlight the problematic aspects which visually based con-
clusions and judgements pose. Nearly all the moral transgressions in the 
novel may be categorized in a similar way. Victor’s scientific crimes are 
based in his failure to design his creature in the image of a natural human 
being. Whereas by all other standards, the creature is in every respect just 
as distinctly human as every other character in the novel, his separateness 
from society is founded on his corrupted image. The initial abandonment 
of the creature, his rejection from society and eventual deadly rampage, 
the framing of the murder of Henry Clerval, and Walton’s final abdica-
tion of Victor’s inherited moral crusade against the creature all come as 
a result of the incongruity between the visually perceived truths, and the 
linguistic/auditory elements of the narrative. 
These incongruities within Frankenstein establish its moral message 
clearly: the subjugation of individuals based on appearance of any kind is 
inherently wrong. The complexity introduced by the novel’s subversion of 
traditional antagonists and protagonist makes this message all the more 
prescient and contextualizes the horror of the creature as perceived in the 
novel as entirely diegetic. However, In the public sphere, the novel’s visu-
al characteristics were interpreted much differently, with most reviewers 
either focusing on the monstrosity of the descriptive prose, the then ideo-
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logically taboo themes which the novel explored, and attacks on the cred-
ibility of the author based on her gender and age. At the same time, audi-
ences were intrigued with the image of the monstrous as portrayed in the 
novel, and the ambiguity of the novel’s depictions of corrupted nature. 
It’s likely for these reasons that the public discontent with the novel laid 
the groundwork for the later iterations of the creature in culture, film, 
and representative media. 
The first filmed adaptation of Frankenstein in 1910 marks a dramatic 
turn towards the starkly visual representations of Frankenstein’s monster 
seen today.2 To adapt Shelley’s dense novel into a short silent film, sev-
eral elements of the narrative had to be stripped away in order to adapt 
the most essential elements of the narrative with as much efficiency as 
possible. The final product displays a conflict between a precocious scien-
tist, and the demonic, immoral creature who torments him. Adapting the 
story of Frankenstein into a visual medium, Edison Studios stripped away 
all literary qualities of the work, leaving each character chained to their 
appearance and physical presence entirely. This establishes binary moral 
distinctions between the creature and Victor, showcasing Victor as a sym-
pathetic intellectual, trying to preserve the sanctity of domestic on-screen 
space from a creature whose only agency throughout the film is rooted 
in either revenge or sexual deviance. The ending is especially significant 
in its message about class relations. Just as Victor’s creature is about to 
physically dominate Victor in on-screen space, he glances his image in the 
reflection of a mirror and relents almost immediately. 
Whereas in the novel, the monster’s abrasive reaction to his own 
self-image spurns increased efforts to develop intellectually and linguis-
tically in order to better compensate for his appearance, the creature in 
film adaptation is made subservient by it, rendered powerless by its own 
identity. The final shots, wherein the monster becomes the image he sees 
in the mirror, followed by Victor’s appearance adjacent to the mirror in 
his place, and his eventual disappearance when Victor raises his hand and 
acknowledges the monster in the mirror, is representative of a deeply de-
structive process of spectatorship throughout the history of Frankenstein’s 
iconography. The establishment of a frame within a frame in the film es-
tablishes the method by which the characters perceive their own identity 
as a purely visual process. By removing the creature from physical space
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and quarantining him to the image in the mirror, he becomes virtual as 
opposed to material, a symbol of aesthetic corruption stripped of all de-
sires, thoughts, or individual agency. Furthermore, Victor’s relationship 
with the image in the mirror suggests that the creature’s transition to 
a symbol is the only way that he can truly be defeated. By denying the 
material existence of the creature, Victor is able to identify the creature 
as a manifestation of his own identity, and his subsequent control over it 
afterwards allows him to remove the creature from his mind and his life 
effortlessly. 
Here the visual is used as a method of ideological control over the 
problematic aesthetic mismatch between the creature’s monstrous ap-
pearance and its humanistic, culturally valuable interior. A recognition 
of these complex characteristics in such a famously monstrous character 
would be an endorsement of the value of women, the poor, or the racially 
persecuted, as the method by which those groups are subjugated, con-
trolled, and persecuted is by the same symbolic manipulation present in 
the film. The creature’s characterization as a protagonist supports a rev-
olutionary theme in the novel. By giving the creature physical dominance 
over not only the characters within the novel, but of the events which 
propel the narrative, the creature wields more power than any other char-
acter within the book. Because the thematic implications of the original 
text posed a threat to the social, economic, racial, and moral hierarchies 
of European society, the character was stripped down to the one-dimen-
sional qualities of its aesthetic existence so that the supremacy of the rich 
over the poor, the intellectual over the uneducated, and the microcosm of 
the societal “other” might be preserved.
Since the film was created by and adapted for the screen by members 
of the upper class for an intended audience of the poor working class, the 
Edison film adaptation may serve as a projection of the upper class’s per-
ception of the lower class, as dirty, sexually deviant, and devoid of any and 
all intelligence, but the internal spectatorship within the film also cap-
tures the innate fascination with visual manipulation. In James A. Weffer-
man’s view, “by forcing us to face the monster’s physical repulsiveness, 
which he can never deny or escape and which aborts his every hope of 
gaining sympathy, film versions of Frankenstein prompt us to rethink his 
monstrosity in terms of visualization.”3 Such intentions emphasize the
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1910 Frankenstein’s conformity to vaudeville tradition, and the cinema of 
attractions that encapsulated much of the film of that time period. By 
placing emphasis on the visual manipulation of natural forms, and their 
dominance over the creature’s identity, the film undermines the themes 
of racially motivated social justice, political revolution and reform, and 
socioeconomic inequity in favor of presenting narratives wherein the low-
er-class viewers root against the success of creature and by extension, 
root against themselves. 
Similar narrative approaches to this kind of aesthetic mismatch 
came later on in the 20th century. David Lynch’s The Elephant Man (1980) 
takes a much more nuanced approach in chronicling the aesthetic chal-
lenges met by real life historical figure Joseph Carrey Merrick as he tries 
to integrate himself into English society.4 Merrick’s character begins as 
a visual attraction, not unlike the creature from the original Frankenstein 
adaptation. His arc throughout the narrative succeeds in showcasing the 
aesthetic monstrosity of Merrick as a periphery characteristic to an oth-
erwise autonomous and virtuous individual. In the dramatic peak of the 
film, Merrick is cornered at a train station dominated in the frame by a 
crowd of people who harass and abuse Merrick for his hideous form, un-
able to perceive him as a human being with human rights. When Merrick 
breaks the silence and declares his own humanity, the auditory identifica-
tion of Merrick as a human being silences the crowd, and the violent mob 
quickly becomes docile and compassionate. The film concludes with Mer-
rick as an idolized figure, a martyr and a symbol not of monstrosity, but of 
exemplifying virtue and optimism in spite of aesthetic monstrosity. This 
film marks a turn in the representation of the monstrous, and a return to 
the inner complexities of the original creature, as well as the strong moral 
message that Mary Shelley’s original Frankenstein connotes. 
The disproportionate value placed on appearance over substance in 
Frankenstein is not a problem which exists in singularity, but is represen-
tative of a complex relationship which affects the way that race, gender, 
and age function in the personal, cultural, and political relationships. The 
labelling of individuals for their aesthetic characters in film and literature 
is important, but the function of stories like Elephant Man and Frankenstein 
is to break down the process by which groups and individuals are labelled 
and controlled in order to emphasize their negative aspects and destruc-
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tive nature. 
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